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Introduction 
Published in 1981, Andrea Dworkin’s Pornography: Men Possessing Women 
appeared to have changed the intellectual landscape – as well as changing 
many people’s lives. Pornography, she argued, not only constitutes violence 
against women; it constitutes the main conduit for such violence, of which 
rape is at once the prime example and the central image. In short, it is 
patriarchy’s most powerful weapon. Feminists’ single most important task, 
therefore, is to deal with pornography. After the initial furore, however, the 
skirmishes – even battles -- the book initiated both within and about feminism 
soon died down. By the early 1990s, it was generally seen, at best, as a 
diversion. Today, who would argue that pornography is patriarchy’s central 
weapon? Indeed, who would argue that pornography is a political issue at all? 
Or that the relations between women and men are the central political issue?  
 
The facts about any putative causal relationship of pornography to rape have 
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been endlessly disputed: the outcome is inconclusive. The psychologists and 
sociologists have all had their similarly inconclusive say. Censorship is out of 
the question. Dworkin and McKinnon’s 1992 Model Antipornography Civil 
Rights Ordinance is a curio of American second-wave feminism, as is 
Dworkin’s book. Pornography is not an issue. Nor indeed is feminism: 
equality has been more or less achieved and the suggestion that patriarchy 
remains crucial is best understood as nostalgia for a different age. 
Or so it seemed until the recent and welcome resurgence of feminist activism 
among young women. 
Still, I shall argue that Dworkin has much to teach us in today’s neo-liberal 
world. Her argument is not primarily a causal one, despite sometimes reading 
as if it were. The legal route she chose as the ground on which to fight may 
well be a dead end, but that does nothing to undermine the force of her 
underlying analysis. It may even be that pornography is less pivotal than she 
thought; but even then, the form of her analysis and the substance of her 
argument, far from being rhetorical and/or fallacious, are exactly what we 
need to counter the depredations of neo-liberal “common sense”. That she 
herself found it difficult to find a language beyond that of liberalism to express 
her argument is no excuse either for ignoring or misinterpreting it. In places 
her argument certainly remains within liberal constraints; in others, however, 
it is profoundly anti-liberal: but this internal tension does not detract from its 
pertinence.  
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What is immediately striking is how little attention has been paid to Dworkin’s 
actual analysis. Take for example two representative collections, the first a 
committed anti-pornography text, the second a more “balanced” one. Edited 
by a formidable campaigner, Catherine Itzin, Pornography: Women, Violence 
and Civil Liberties: a Radical New View (1992), contains twenty-six articles, 
only two of which (Kappeler; Cameron and Frazer) engage with Dworkin’s 
analysis (and even then not in detail) rather than with its perceived 
implications. Drucilla Cornell’s 2000 collection, Feminism and Pornography, 
while including two articles by Dworkin herself, contains nothing about 
Pornography among its thirty-nine pieces. Alison Assiter’s 1989 Pornography, 
Feminism and the Individual is an honorable exception in its analysis of how 
pornography exemplifies sexism (for all that it argues, like her later work 
[Assiter and Avedon, 1993], against both censorship and Dworkin’s emphasis 
on pornography). A 2012 google search for ‘Andrea Dworkin pornography 
critique’ brings up some 3640 items: none of the first hundred or so address 
what she herself identifies as her argument. So what does she actually say? 
 
Dworkin’s Basic Argument 
Here is how Andrea Dworkin opens her book:  
This is a book about the meaning of pornography and the system of 
power in which pornography exists. Its particular theme is the power of 
men in pornography (Dworkin, 1981, p.9: my emphases). 
The fifth short paragraph on that opening page reads: 
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 With respect to both obscenity and the First Amendment: this is not a 
book about what should or should not be shown; it is a book about the 
meaning of what is being shown (Dworkin, 1981, p.9). 
What could be clearer? The fact that Dworkin would later argue about what 
should or should not be shown without legal redress does not alter the fact 
that this text concerns the meaning of pornography. As for the charge of 
essentialism – boys are culturally moulded into patriarchy through 
pornography, an argument she certainly makes in the book (Dworkin, 1981, 
pp. 48-69) -- the final sentence of her Preface suggests at least a tension 
between the essentialism suggested both here and elsewhere, and her 
opening insistence that, quoting Christabel Pankhurst (1913), ‘Men have a 
simple remedy for this state of things. They can alter their way of life’ 
(Dworkin, 1981, p.9). Dworkin’s topic, then, is exactly what her title 
announces: men possessing women. (For discussion of women as chattel, 
see Dworkin, 1981, pp. 101-102 and, stunningly, Rhys 1969a, 1969b, 1971, 
1973). That is at once the meaning of pornography and what pornography is. 
Pornography is not simply those artefacts (films, photos, texts) in which ‘the 
graphic depiction of whores’ (Dworkin, 1981, p.10) takes place: it is also and 
at once the material reality in which those artefacts consist and which they 
exemplify.  
 
How should we understand this claim? Crucially, it is not the simple causal 
claim that pornography causes sexual violence, and in particular rape, 
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although – as I shall go on to argue – some sort of causal claim is involved. 
But it is a far more complex one. Nor is it a claim about the conditions of 
production of visual pornography; about what is and what is not pornographic; 
about whether or not, and if so how, pornography should be censored; or 
even about what, if anything, is to be done about pornography’s role in at 
once exemplifying and helping instantiate male sexual violence. Dworkin has 
plenty of things to say in the book about the first two of these -- especially 
about the enculturation of boys and the torture of women in the production of 
pornography – but that is not its primary subject. She also had much to say 
about the last three (censorship, how feminists should use law and the 
prospects for men’s changing). Certainly one might wish that she had been 
more careful to separate out, both conceptually and textually, those sets of 
claims from that about pornography’s function. Nonetheless, it is hardly 
difficult to do so. Nor will it do to read this text through the prism of her later 
writing, claims and campaigns.  
 
Part of the difficulty lies in Dworkin’s background liberal assumptions. She 
does not articulate the details of her view about ‘the meaning of what is being 
shown’ because, working within an overall liberal framework as she does, she 
sees no need to do so. Three difficulties thus tend to hobble her argument. 
First, the liberal model of harm is one that cannot articulate harms that do not 
accrue to specified individuals: hence her stress on the conditions of 
production of pornography. Second, it assumes a unilinear notion of 
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causation in the social world: hence the role of her psychological-sociological 
claims. Third, there is a commitment, especially in American liberalism, to the 
remedy of law and in particular to seeking such remedy in terms of the First 
Amendment and ‘free speech’: hence her later work. But her insight in this 
text transcends all these limitations. 
 
To show how, I shall say something about cause and effect; then discuss an 
anti-liberal view of harm; and finally return to Dworkin’s text. 
 
Cause and Effect  
Already in 1992 Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer made it clear ‘what 
is wrong with framing the pornography issue in this way’, [ie, as an argument 
about cause and effect]: ‘feminists can move beyond simplistic notions of 
cause and effect without conceding the argument altogether’ (Cameron and 
Frazer, 1982, p.359). They argue, first -- and rightly -- that causal accounts of 
action are self-contradictory: if what you do were caused in the way that the 
events in the physical world are, then you would not have acted at all, but 
merely behaved. Second, that direct and unilinear causal connections are not 
the only connections between actions and events in the social world. Again, 
they are right. Their suggestion that sexual sadists take on a culturally 
available role – that theirs is a performance – is particularly apposite: access 
to that role is available in and through a set of meanings encapsulated in 
pornography.  
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Let me clarify the sorts of connection they propose. One response to the 
Holocaust has been to regard it as the apotheosis of the Enlightenment. What 
might this mean? Clearly the claim is not that the Enlightenment 
straightforwardly caused the Holocaust, in the same sort of way that anti-
semitism was one of its causes. The latter claim argues, first, that in the 
absence of anti-semitism, the Holocaust would not have taken place -- anti-
semitism is a necessary condition of the Holocaust; and, second, that anti-
semitism was enough – in the circumstances concerned -- to bring about the 
Holocaust -- anti-semitism is a sufficient condition of the Holocaust. That is to 
say, the claim that anti-semitism caused the Holocaust is like the claim that a 
particular earthquake caused such-and-such a tsunami; or that the beaker of 
water turned blue because I added copper sulphate. In short, the claim about 
anti-semitism – a social scientific claim – approximates to the causal claims of 
natural science (albeit in more complex form). But no one would claim that 
the Enlightenment was the necessary and (in the circumstances) sufficient 
cause of the Holocaust.  
 
So how is the alleged connection between the Enlightenment and the 
Holocaust to be understood? Certainly it is not a question of the 
Enlightenment’s being a sufficient condition of the Holocaust; the claim is not 
that, given the Enlightenment, the Holocaust had to happen (in the absence 
of countervailing conditions). Is it then a question of the Enlightenment’s 
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being a necessary condition of the Holocaust, the claim that the Holocaust 
would not have occurred had it not been for the Enlightenment? Adorno and 
Horkheimer come close to this position: 'In the most general sense of 
progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men 
from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth 
radiates disaster triumphant’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1973, p.1). The 
problem, however, is that the notion of a necessary condition is far less 
precise than that of a sufficient condition. Consider again the copper 
sulphate’s turning the water blue. Its introduction into the beaker of water is 
only one of the necessary conditions of the water’s turning blue; and it is 
necessary only given the circumstances – someone could have poured blue 
ink into it. That is to say, those conditions are picked out as necessary which 
in some way stand out from all the other background conditions. Thus the 
Enlightenment is understood as an intrusion: unlike the presence of oxygen, 
water and gravity, the technology of industrialization, the formation of the Nazi 
Party, the presence in Europe of Jewish people, the founding of Christianity 
and an indefinite number of other necessary conditions of the Holocaust’s 
taking place, the Enlightenment stands out in some way. But it is hard to say 
exactly how. Berel Lang speaks of ‘affiliation’ (Lang, 1990, pp. 189-206): as 
James Schmidt puts it, he argues that ‘because it failed to transform 
European society, the Enlightenment left in place a structure of religious 
prejudices and intolerance that would, a century and a half later, result in 
Nazi anti –Semitism …’ and that therefore ‘the Enlightenment ideal of 
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religious toleration … paradoxically creates a "conceptual structure" that 
has an "affiliation" with Nazi genocide’ (Schmidt, 2000, 747). This is how 
Lang himself elucidates the idea: 
… certain ideas prominent in the Enlightenment are recognizable in the 
conceptual framework embodied in the Nazi genocide; and … if the 
relation between those two historical moments is not one of direct 
cause and effect … the Enlightenment establishes a ground of historical 
possibility or causal evocation for the Nazi genocide (Lang, 1990, 168-
169). 
And having granted that that does not ‘demonstrate an historical connection 
between the two’, he goes on to argue that 
The ideational framework in which the act of the Nazi genocide was set 
involved – required – a number of concepts that had been central in 
enlightenment thought (Lang, 1990, p.,169). 
Given the historical contingencies of the matter, certain Enlightenment 
concepts were a necessary condition of the Holocaust. In principle, other 
concepts might have been; but given the relevant history, it is these (among 
others) that were necessary.  
 
Two things need emphasizing. First, such an understanding of what might be 
termed the contingencies of necessary conditions seems very close to the 
sort of necessary condition I earlier characterized as the “standing out” sort. 
Second, the Enlightenment serves as such a condition of the Holocaust 
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because ‘it failed’ in some way: that is to say, it is a negative necessary 
condition. Its being a necessary condition is the outcome of something not 
done, or not achieved. Compare a mechanic’s failure to check a car’s brake 
fluid: given the circumstances, the failure was a necessary condition of the 
brakes’ failing and the thus the car’s crashing. It is not that this failure directly 
directly caused the crash; but still, something not done played a part in the 
relevant causal story. This sort of account can be given also of successes. 
Imagine the mechanic’s topping up the brake fluid and the car’s then narrowly 
avoiding a crash: had they not checked and topped up the brake fluid, the car 
would (very probably) have crashed. It is what the mechanic did that “stands 
out” in the explanatory story.  
 
One might say, then, that what the Enlightenment achieved made possible 
the eventual end of religious discrimination against Jews and Roman 
Catholics in Europe; and at the same time argue, like Lang, that something 
the Enlightenment failed to achieve -- recognizing other people as rational, 
autonomous beings unless they met certain conditions -- made possible the 
Holocaust. Thus Lang argues that Jews were emancipated only if they 
rejected their identity as Jews and became secular liberal individuals; the 
Enlightenment offered emancipation only conditionally.  
 
The harm done by the Enlightenment in failing to prevent the Holocaust is 
thus not directly causal: the Holocaust could have occurred without the 
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Enlightenment; nor was the Enlightenment sufficient to bring about the 
Holocaust. The connections are both more complex and less direct. Nor, 
furthermore, is the harm done by the Enlightenment to be understood in 
terms of this or that individual person being affected: its harm is more diffuse 
than that.  
 
Liberal harm 
The classical liberal view of what constitutes harm is encapsulated in Mill’s 
claim that if an action does not cause ‘perceptible hurt to any assignable 
individual except himself’ then it is not to be prohibited: the harm has to be 
‘perceptible’ (Mill, 1989, p.13) and it has to be an identifiable person who is 
harmed. Harm is direct and measurable, and what causes it is relatively 
straightforward: A hits B; B hurts. However, Mill himself sees the difficulty 
here, though he hardly acknowledges its seriousness:  
 [H]ow (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of 
 society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is 
 an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything 
 seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at 
 east to his near connections, and often far beyond them’ (Mill, 1989, p. 
 80; for discussion, see Brecher, 1997, pp. 151-154).  
As Beverley Brown remarked in the context of discussions of pornography in 
the wake of Pornography, ‘feminism is concerned with the interests of a 
constituency of women for whom pornography will have different effects on 
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different individual women. …Consequently the level of harm to such an 
interest is not amenable to liberalism… ’ (Brown, 1981,12). Some actions and 
practices, that is to say, whatever their direct and identifiable consequences, 
affect also the attitudes (moral, political and otherwise) of people neither 
directly affected nor readily individuated. Consider for example the Sexual 
Offences Reform Act of 1967, which led, however indirectly, to increasing 
acceptance of gay and lesbian sex and so to more gay and lesbian sex; or 
the Abortion Act, also of 1967, which led to far more and far more easily 
obtained abortions than those it specified; or the availability of mobile phones, 
which has led to changes in public etiquette, the structures of social 
arrangements and more; or the impact of TV “reality” shows on political 
processes such as elections. It is not a matter just of unintended 
consequences (though it is also that) but rather of effects on heretofore quite 
unrelated attitudes, which in turn make other actions and practices feasible, 
which in turn leads to the presence of such actions and practices in society.  
 
The Relation of Pornography to Patriarchy  
Andrea Dworkin’s central claim about pornography’s relation to what men do 
– its relation to patriarchy – is just like that. Recall how the book opens: 
This is a book about the meaning of pornography and the system of 
power in which pornography exists. Its particular theme is the power of 
men in pornography (Dworkin, 1981, p.9). 
This clearly formed the backbone of her later campaigns. So, for example, in 
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a section on pornographers in ‘Against the Male Flood’, she makes claims 
about ‘the real flesh-and-blood women in the pictures’; and goes on to claim, 
concerning written pornography, that ‘the pornography [the Marquis de Sade] 
wrote was an urgent part of the sexual abuse he practised’ (Dworkin, 1992, 
pp. 524, 525). Both of these are straightforwardly empirical claims. The 
relevant paragraph closes, however, with the quite different sort of claim that 
‘Pornography, even when it is written, is sex because of the dynamism of the 
sexual hatred in it; and for pornographers, the sexual abuse of women as 
commonly understood and pornography are both (my emphasis) acts of 
sexual predation….’ (Dworkin, 1992, p. 525). As Wittgenstein observed of 
ordinary language, so Dworkin here observes of the language of 
pornography: its meaning is constituted by the use to which it is put. That is 
how it is possible for the empirical situations she discusses to arise at all. The 
use, furthermore, of pornography, helps develop the language of 
pornography… which in turn is put to further use… and so on. Thus one 
might, following Lang, speak of an affiliation between pornography and 
patriarchy; or of what pornography helps make possible in and about 
patriarchy. 
 
Again, Cameron and Frazer argue in similar fashion: ‘Even if … 
[pornography] does not cause sexual violence it may be criticized of its role in 
shaping certain forms of desire (and not others).’ Its ‘place in the culture of 
transcendence/transgression’ is held ‘in virtue of several characteristics: the 
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narratives it constructs, the form in which it renders them and the position it 
has in our culture as inherently a transgressive genre (though at the same 
time a pervasive one)’ (Cameron and Frazer, 1992, p.376). Since then, our 
culture has become increasingly sexualized, and pornography remains 
central to the ‘construction of desire’ concerned: pornography ‘shape(s) it in 
particular ways’ (Cameron and Frazer, 1992, p. 376). What Dworkin insists on 
– without using the term -- is that pornography constructs sexual desire in our 
culture at least as much as it is itself constructed in response to that 
constructed sexual desire; in short, that the relation between pornography 
and sexual desire is dialectical. And so Susan Sontag’s extraordinary claim 
that ‘(E)xperiences aren’t pornographic; only images and representations – 
structures of the imagination – are’ (Sontag, 1969, p. 49) is profoundly 
mistaken. Pornography’s role in respect of sexual desire is the same as that 
of, for example, the advertising of consumer goods in relation to the desire for 
such goods. Just as the car advert offers a model – in an active sense – of 
driving cars, so pornography offers ‘a model of how to do sex’ (Cameron and 
Frazer, 1992, p. 377). There are two central claims here. First, such a 
model’s appeal to an extent depends on, respectively, how cars are driven 
and how sex is done in our culture; and at the same time the model offered 
also affects precisely those practices. Second, ‘how cars are driven’ and ‘how 
sex is done’ includes also how they are not driven and how it is not done; and 
again in two ways. The first concerns the attraction of transgression, of how 
cars are not supposed to be driven and of how sex is not supposed to be 
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done; the second what is ruled out (if anything) by the model because it is 
transgressive.  
 
This second point, about what we rule out because transgressive, is as 
important as it is rarely noticed. Consider not speeding because you might 
hurt someone; consider not doing sex violently for the same reason. As 
Giorgio Agamben has recently put it at a very general level: 
 There is, nevertheless, another and more insidious operation of power 
 that does not immediately affect what humans can do – their potentiality 
 – but rather their ‘impotentiality’, that is, what they cannot do, or better, 
 can not do (Agamben, 2011, p. 43).  
‘Today’s man,’ Agamben says, ‘… has become blind not to his capacities but 
to his incapacities, not to what he can do but to what he cannot, or can not, 
do’ (Agamben, 2011, p.44). I am tempted to dub this negative causality: 
obstacles and barriers to doing something are removed, obstacles and 
barriers that in certain cases need to remain in place if we are not to do things 
we ought not to do. Consider President Obama’s commitment to the so-called 
war on terror blinding him to his capacity to not order the assassination of 
Osama bin Laden. A practice exists; it is “normal”; in light of the nature of that 
“normality” another practice is introduced; in turn, this new practice further 
entrenches that “normality” … and so on. This is surely all too familiar. So 
what stands in the way of our understanding what Andrea Dworkin tells us 
about pornography? Why might pornography be different from all these other 
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aspects of our everyday lives? For this is precisely what she claims about 
pornography: it blinds men to things they can not do, to things they have the 
capacity to not do. Pornography, she tells us, functions in this regard in just 
the same way as other ideologies, or elements of ideology.  
 
Dworkin’s text  
Now to Dworkin’s text. Certainly some of her fire is directed at the fact (then) 
that ‘real women are required for the depiction’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 200) of 
women as vile whores. And yet although she insists on the centrality of 
‘women in makeup and costumes under hot lights…’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 147; 
and see p. 138ff.), on the real women used to make visual pornography, she 
immediately, and admittedly rather contradictorily, goes on to quote Suzanne 
Brøgger to the effect that the ‘essence of rape (which is what she takes such 
photography to be) […] lies not in the degree of psychological and physical 
force …. but in the very attitude toward women that makes disguised or 
undisguised rape possible’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 138). And so her claims that 
‘pornography itself is objective and real and central to the male sexual 
system’ (Dworkin, 1981, p.200) and [T]he force depicted in pornography is 
objective and real because force is so used against women’, so that ‘[T]he 
debasing of women depicted in pornography are objective and real because 
women are so used’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 201) might seem ambiguous. While 
she can be read as simply making a set of empirical claims, however, notice 
that what she claims is a connection from “the real world” to pornography. 
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Pornography, she is telling us, exemplifies patriarchy – as well as helping to 
keep it in place: 
Pornography does not, as some claim, refute the idea that female 
sexuality is dirty: instead, pornography embodies and exploits this idea; 
pornography sells and promotes it (Dworkin, 1981, p. 201). 
Pornography at once reflects and requires sex as transgressive; and 
transgressive in a particular way, namely as making use of women merely as 
means to an end. So while it is the case, she maintains, that ‘[R]eal women 
are tied up, stretched, hanged, fucked, gang-banged, whipped, beaten …’ 
(Dworkin, 1981, p. 201), an appalling effect of the pornography industry that 
cannot be ignored, pornography’s meaning and function are to be found not 
in that fact but in patriarchy; the realities she describes here are side-effects. 
What she is claiming is precisely that the role of pornography is to construct 
male sexual desire, which in turn plays a pivotal patriarchal function. The 
point is that pornography at once reflects, maintains and promotes an 
understanding of women’s – and, I would add, men’s – sexuality and sexual 
desire which in turn itself reflects, maintains and promotes patriarchy. 
 
One might even describe Dworkin’s analysis as implicitly Kantian, rather than 
either straightforwardly consequentialist or morally and politically liberal: 
 
The new pornography industry is a left-wing industry: promoted 
especially by the boys of the sixties as simple pleasure, lusty fun, public 
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sex, the whore brought out of the bourgeois (sic) home into the streets 
for the democratic consumption of all men… . The dirty little secret of the 
left-wing pornography industry is not sex but commerce … . Free male 
sexuality wants, has a right to, produces and consumes pornography 
because pornography is pleasure. … Capitalism is not wicked or cruel 
when the commodity is the whore; profit is not wicked or cruel when the 
alienated worker is a female piece of meat; corporate bloodsucking is not 
wicked or cruel when the corporations in question, organized crime 
syndicates, sell cunt … . …[V]iolence by the powerful against the 
powerless is not wicked or cruel when it is called sex; slavery is not 
wicked or cruel when the tormented are women, whores, cunts (my 
emphases) (Dworkin, 1981, pp. 208, 209). 
It takes very little further argument to make these sorts of argument against 
pornography tout court, and not just against pornography on grounds of the 
conditions of its production. Her objection is precisely to what Sontag 
celebrates in Story of O: 
 The ‘perfect submissiveness’ that here original lover and then Sir 
 Stephen demand of her echoes the extinction of the self explicitly 
 required of a Jesuit novice or Zen pupil [in both cases men, of course]. 
 O is ‘that absent-minded person who has yielded up her will in order to 
 be totally remade,’ to be made fit to serve a will far more powerful and 
 authoritative than her own (Sontag, 1969, p. 68).  
Quite so. Wickedness and cruelty can occur vicariously and are none the less 
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wicked or cruel for that, not least in terms of what they do to “the consumer”. 
Consider here the very different attitudes evinced in proposals to prohibit the 
purchase, as opposed to the sale, of sex. Dworkin is particularly clear about 
this in her discussion of women as, historically, ‘chattel property’, in the 
context of considering gay sex: ‘A man must function as the human center of 
a chattel-oriented sensibility, surrounded by objects to be used so that he can 
experience his own power and presence’ (Dworkin, 1981, p.104). So, she 
argues, ‘it is not surprising that men conspicuously view themselves as 
authentic persons and the others clustered around them, especially their 
sexual intimates, especially women and children, as objects’ (Dworkin, 1981, 
p. 103). True, Dworkin appears not to appreciate the full force of her anti-
capitalist, anti-liberal arguments in respect of their implications for the men 
who consume pornography. But that is unsurprising: compare the desperate 
contortions Mill has to make to justify not permitting the self-harm of allowing 
oneself to be sold into slavery (Mill, 1989, pp. 102-103). Thus, while Dworkin 
is right to castigate much of Lasch’s defence of de Sade, she misses the 
important point he makes -- and to which she might have helped herself -- 
when she criticizes his ‘peculiar’ interpretation of de Sade as perceiving, 
‘more clearly than the feminists, that all freedoms under capitalism come in 
the end to the same thing, the same universal obligation to enjoy and be 
enjoyed’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 99, quoting Lasch, 1979, p.133). On the other 
hand, she also gives voice to a profoundly anti-liberal position in the 
concluding paragraphs of her discussion of what ‘men and boys’ are, and 
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pornography’s function as at once expressing and maintaining such a sort of 
masculinity: 
Everything in life is part of it. Nothing is off in its own corner, isolated 
from the rest. While on the surface this may seem self-evident, the 
favorite conceit of male culture is that experience can be fractured, 
literally its bones split, and that one can examine the splinters as if they 
were not part of the bone, or the bone as if it were not part of the body. 
This conceit replicates in its values and methodology the sexual 
reductionism of the male and is derived from it. … So the scientist can 
work on bomb or virus, the artist on poem, the photographer on picture, 
with no appreciation of its meaning outside itself; and even reduce each 
of these things to an abstract element and nothing else – literally 
attribute meaning to or discover meaning in nothing else (Dworkin, 
1981, p. 67). 
What is this if not a clear critique of the empiricism, both theoretical and 
methodological, that historically underlies and makes possible the liberalism 
that is its normative outcome (see Brecher, 1997, pp. 15-52)? 
  
Two points are particularly important in her – at this point -- anti-liberal 
analysis. First, what she claims is independent of whether you think sexual 
desire is “hard-wired” or constructe: if the former, then her point is to be 
understood as one about its forms; if the latter, then as a point about sexual 
desire itself. Either way, it need not depend on any essentialism. The 
 21 
biological-sounding claims she makes in the text about boys, men and the 
role of the penis (Dworkin, 1981, ch. 2, pp. 48-69) probably justify the 
description of at least this passage as essentialist. But her general argument 
does not depend on essentialism: it can as well be understood as social 
constructionist. Indeed her active legal proposals for how we – or rather, 
people in the USA of the 1980s -- might set about at least starting to deal with 
it sit extremely uneasily with any essentialism about male sexuality. Second, 
what she claims is something that liberalism cannot recognize, going as it 
does against its simplistic, cause/effect, unidirectional and individualistic 
understanding of harm (and indeed of benefit) and its parallel inability to 
grasp what ideology – not least its own -- is and how it functions. 
 
Let me say more about this second point. Neither harm nor good attach solely 
to identifiable individuals. To go back to my earlier examples, the impact of 
the Sexual Offences and Abortion Acts of 1967: one way of generalizing from 
these is to suggest that harm and good can be brought about not just directly, 
but indirectly, through the effect of something (an action; a practice; a belief) 
on the range of what comes to enter the moral, political and other contexts, 
on what comes to be regarded as within or beyond the possibly acceptable. 
That, in fact, is how moral change tends to come about: think of women’s 
liberation or slavery. The moral climate sets the parameters of moral 
possibility (Brecher, 1997, pp. 147-159). That is what Dworkin has in mind 
when she says things like these: 
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This is a book about the meaning of pornography and the system of 
power in which pornography exists (the book’s opening sentence) 
(Dworkin, 1981, p.9). 
 
(Quoting Kate Millett): Our self-contempt originates in this: in knowing 
we are cunt (Dworkin, 1981, p.199). 
 
He comes to the pornography a believer; he goes away from it a 
missionary (Dworkin, 1981, p.202). 
 
The metaphysics of male domination is that women are whores 
(Dworkin, 1981, p.203). 
 
So when she ends the book by saying that ‘We will know that we are free 
when the pornography no longer exists’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 204), she is not 
intending to make the causal claim that getting rid of pornography will liberate 
women; rather, we shall know that women have been liberated only when 
pornography has disappeared. For pornography is – whatever else it also is – 
at once a symptom of oppression as well as one of its vehicles. Of course this 
is hard to express in liberal language, because liberalism cannot recognize 
the complex interplay between the social and the individual or the place of the 
moral climate in making things possible or impossible, more or less likely. 
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Conclusion: Dworkin’s Anti-Liberalism 
The standard objections to Dworkin’s central argument fall, as Cameron and 
Frazer showed long ago. It is not a simple matter of pornography’s causal 
impact : we can be indirectly harmed, as when someone insults the person on 
the supermarket checkout: although the insult is not aimed at me, I am 
insulted by its being directed at a person who is not in a position to answer 
back. In the same way, their having to take a menial job because they feel, 
rightly, that it is one they cannot refuse, is an offence to me – and it is an 
offence to me whether or not they themselves perceive it as offensive to 
them. Compare marriage, the family, charity; or the experience of shame one 
might have at someone else’s action, as when British troops torture a man to 
death in Iraq. Nor is consent relevant: for, far from people’s wants justifying 
their acts, the question at issue is the moral justification of their wants and – 
therefore – the moral climate within which such wants come to be had. Nor 
will it do to claim of pornography that it is a game: for while as a genre it has 
similarities to a game (rules, moves and the like) it is also – and again as a 
genre – closely connected with “real life”. To put it crudely: it is not just a 
game. Those who deny the seriousness of pornography in maintaining 
patriarchy cannot rely on the figure of pornography as “playful sex” to do so: 
for what “playful sex” might be in another world and what this “playful” sex is 
lhere, now, are quite different things.  
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Nor does pornography have directly to abuse those it depicts in order to be 
abusive. As Dworkin herself puts it in a later discussion, ‘Pornography, even 
when written, is sex because of the dynamism of the sexual hatred in it; and 
for pornographers, the sexual abuse of women as commonly understood and 
pornography are both acts of sexual predation, which is how they live. … The 
pornographers are the secret police of male supremacy: keeping women 
subordinate through intimidation and assault’ (Dworkin, 1992, p.525). The 
form of her argument here is that of standard anti-liberal analyses of all sorts 
of everyday phenomena, from the buying and selling of body parts for 
transplants to working on the supermarket check-out. So, for instance, one 
might argue that ‘for free-market employers, the economic exploitation of 
people as commonly understood and standard employment contracts are 
both acts of (economic) predation (and more), which is how they live’; or that 
‘for charities, the abuse of the poor as commonly understood and charitable 
work are both acts of exploitation, which is how they live’. And in both cases, 
they, with many others, ‘are the secret police of neo-liberal capitalism: 
keeping people subordinate through intimidation and assault’. Whether or not 
one agrees with (any of) these arguments, how they work and what they 
claim is clear. The same is the case of Dworkin’s arguments against 
pornography. 
 
Finally, the phenomena of gay porn and of “women’s porn” do nothing to 
undermine her case. These genres are takes on, imitations of, male porn that 
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themselves reflect and maintain patriarchy no less than does male porn. The 
“relations” portrayed are no less about power and domination and the realities 
at once reflected and furthered no different; and the underlying trope of 
domination is irredeemably sexist. To put this another way: the liberation of 
women is about more than the sex they themselves do or do not engage in; 
and it cannot take place in the absence of a liberation of men from their 
patriarchal role and function.  
 
Dworkin wrote about the world she lived in. What gay porn, lesbian porn, 
women’s porn, whatever porn might be like in some other world is all beside 
the point. In a non-patriarchal world, porn could not be what porn (now) is. In 
a free world, or an equal world, it would not be a use of people, whether of 
individual women (the models), individual customers (the consumers) or of 
customers in general (liberalism and capitalism). Whether it could then still be 
pornography is another question. Transgressive sex, one might speculate, 
might include all sorts of representations and actions – if the transgressive is 
sexually important in just any conceivable social set-up. The issue is what it 
would transgress in a society very different from ours: for pornography 
requires to be transgressive – whether acceptably or not – to constitute 
pornography. Questions of a similar form could of course be asked about a 
range of phenomena besides pornography. They should be asked, just as the 
question Dworkin asks about the current pornographic structure of sexuality 
needs to be asked. 
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